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SAŽETAK
Teorija racionalnog izbora pretpostavlja da se 
pri odlučivanju o konzumaciji ili nekonzumaciji 
određenih proizvoda potrošači koriste analizom 
radi procjene vrijednosti individualnih pokazate-
lja preferencija. Iz te perspektive postoje prefe-
rencije vezane uz rizik i vrijeme. Prve pokazuju 
averziju prema riziku i izražavaju se koefi cijentom 
averzije prema riziku, dok druge mjere stupanj 
preferencije za sadašnje zadovoljstvo u odnosu 
prema istom zadovoljstvu u budućnosti. Stupanj 
preferencije za sadašnje zadovoljstvo u odnosu 
na isto zadovoljstvo u budućnosti izražen je sto-
pom preferencije vremena. Od pušača koji po-
kazuju nisku stopu preferencije prema vremenu 
i visoku stopu razine koefi cijenta averzije može 
se očekivati uspješnost u prestanku pušenja. Cilj 
je rada proučavanje pušača iz perspektive teori-
je racionalnog izbora kako bi se otkrili čimbenici 
ABSTRACT
The rational choice theory assumes that, when 
deciding whether to consume some goods or 
not, consumers use analysis in order to estimate 
the values of individual preference indicators. 
From this point of view, there are risk and time 
preferences. The former show aversion to a risk 
and are expressed through the risk aversion co-
effi  cient, while the latter measure the degree of 
preference for present satisfaction in relation to 
the same satisfaction in the future. The degree 
of preference for present satisfaction regarding 
the same satisfaction in the future is expressed 
by the time preference rate. Smokers with a low 
time preference rate and high risk aversion coef-
fi cient level can be expected to be successful in 
cessation. The aim of this paper is to study smok-
ers from the perspective of rational choice the-

































koji utječu na njihovo ponašanje. Istraživanjem 
je ustanovljeno da su značajni čimbenici pona-
šanja pušača sljedeći: spol, dob, obrazovanje, ko-
efi cijent averzije prema riziku i stopa vremenske 
preferencije. Analiza ponašanja pušača, uz uva-
žavanje odgovarajućih ograničenja i mogućno-
sti, dobro je razvijen alat za istraživanje i interpre-
taciju stvarnosti.
behavior. The study (investigation) found that 
the signifi cant factors for smokers’ behavior are: 
gender, age, education, risk aversion coeffi  cient, 
and the time preference rate. Analysis of smok-
ers’ behavior, with appropriate limits and qualifi -
cations, is a well-developed and highly eff ective 


























For a long time, it was believed that economic 
analysis should only be applied to economic 
phenomena – to the factors of production and 
their allocation, explicit markets, factors income, 
their distribution, and consumption. Everything 
else was outside the explanatory domain of ra-
tional choice theory (Begović, 2004, p. 76).
For a long time, the analysis of addictive behav-
ior was reserved for other non-economic scienc-
es, primarily sociology and psychology. The usu-
al sociological standpoint is that addictive be-
havior should be treated as unwise, compulsive, 
destructive, and, of course, irrational. However, 
for the proponents of rational choice theory, ad-
dictive behavior is just like any other economic 
behavior – economically rational (Tomer, 2001, p. 
243).
This paper has two main purposes. The fi rst is to 
explain why addictive behavior is not rational. 
The other is to develop a socio-economic mod-
el of addictive behavior as an alternative to the 
economic theory of rational addiction.
Explanations and models applicable to eco-
nomic concepts are developed based on the 
knowledge of a variety of behavioral disci-
plines, especially psychology. The appropriate 
structure presented in this paper was made in 
the hope that this interdisciplinary approach 
would help us see addiction behavior in its true 
light. The structure of this paper is as follows. 
Section Two reviews the basic features of ratio-
nal choice theory. Section Three introduces the 
concept of addiction in the theory of rational 
addiction. Section Four explains the socio-eco-
nomic model of addictive behavior. Section 
Five is devoted to the reconsideration of basic 
rational choice assumptions, which include the 
results of research studies and the statistical 
testing. The closing section of this paper focus-
es on the analysis of smokers’ preferences with 
the aim of discovering some new facts about 
human behavior.
2. RATIONAL CHOICE 
THEORY
The perception of limited resources as a univer-
sal property of economic activities, and sub-
jective evaluations of benefi ts and investments 
has turned the economic science into practical 
guidelines that require people to follow rational 
economic behavior. Similar to all other sciences, 
economics provides various interpretations of 
rational economic behavior and, on the basis of 
these fi ndings, forms conclusions, depending on 
the theoretical prism through which it observes 
facts linked to the adoption and enforcement of 
rational economic decisions.
Until the 20th century, there had been a rela-
tively small number of theories of rational deci-
sion-making. This changed radically in the 20th 
century, when the fi rst models of rational behav-
ior emerged, fi rst in the theory of operational re-
search and then in rational choice theory. Rational 
choice theory concerns rational human behavior. 
In rational choice theory, the principle of rational-
ity is characterized by subjectivity and constraint. 
The following is a brief description of subjectivity 
as a universal characteristic of rationality.
In comparison with the neoclassical direction, ra-
tional choice theory fundamentally changed the 
paradigm of rationality. Rational choice theorists 
renounced the useless “demarcation” between 
rationality and irrationality and focused on the 
subjective determination of rationality. If chil-
dren prefer to watch TV instead of studying, they 
act subjectively and rationally, although they 
might have a diff erent opinion in 10 years’ time 
(Šveri, 1997, p. 40).
For Downs, all activity actors are target orient-
ed and always rational. “The monk deliberately 
chooses as his target the achievement of the 
state of mythical perception of objective reali-
ty. To accomplish that, one needs to free one’s 
mind of all logical thoughts and conscious goal 
setting. From an economic point of view, this lib-

































treated as irrational and ultimately too irrational 
from the perspective of some non-economic 
defi nitions of rationality” (Downs, 1957, p. 5).
In order to discover the rules that people use in 
their rational economic behavior, neoclassical the-
ory does not pay enough attention to some im-
portant elements and, thus, has two fundamental 
shortcomings. Firstly, it assumes that expenditure 
to obtain information equals zero or nearly zero. 
Secondly, neoclassical theory ignores legal trans-
action costs. Famous philosophers, such as Max 
Weber (1978) and Joseph A. Schumpeter, presum-
ably did not pay attention to such considerations. 
According to Weber’s typology (Šveri, 1997, p. 40), 
only conscious focus on the ultimate goal and 
conscious choice of the means of its realization are 
considered to be rational. Therefore, he makes a 
distinction between “traditionally rational” behav-
ior (stimulated by rationally selected goals that are 
realized by rational means) on the one hand, and 
“traditionally irrational” behavior (that is based on 
habit and routine) and “aff ective behavior” (that 
is caused by aff ects and emotions) on the other 
hand (Stojanović 2007, p. 134). Nevertheless, both 
“traditionally irrational” behavior and partly “aff ec-
tive behavior” can be rational (Weber, 1978, p. 24).
If the analysis includes time constraints, it be-
comes clear that, in some trivial situations, it is 
often more rational to make a decision immedi-
ately, and then to behave irrationally if there is no 
reason for rational behavior. No matter whether 
we talk about eating with a fork and knife or with 
chopsticks, combing our hair or tidying our room 
in the morning, these are all cases where tradi-
tional behavior is rational. Just as Weber (1978), 
Schumpeter remained doubtful regarding the 
principle of rationality. For example, Schumpeter 
made regular use of the term “fi eld of rationality” 
to explain entrepreneurs’ behavior. However, he 
did not pay attention to terms such as “rational-
ity” in the circumstances in which information 
may be incomplete and behavior irrational and 
variable (Šveri, 1997, p. 40).
Rational choice theory resolved all rationality 
defi nition fl aws and brought the rationality prin-
ciple to its logical end, recognizing the import-
ant role that time, transaction costs, and other 
factors have in everyday life.
Carl Menger, John R. Commons, Ronald H. Coase 
and Friedrich A. Hayek were the fi rst to include 
transaction costs in economic analysis (Šveri, 
1997, p. 43). In addition, Frank Knight and John 
M. Keynes analyzed some aspects of uncertain-
ty (Knight, 2002, p. 50). Herbert A. Simon (1957) 
was the fi rst to formulate the general principle of 
bounded rationality that is applicable to all so-
cial sciences. He strongly denied the unrealistic 
assumptions of neoclassicists and elaborated on 
the concept of rationality in conditions of uncer-
tainty and the abnormal distribution of informa-
tion (Simon, 1957, p. 279).
The next important step was made by George 
J. Stigler (1961). According to Stigler, a subject 
(consciously or unconsciously) maximizes the 
amount of information collected, so the ultimate 
gain of additional information equals its fi nal ex-
penditure (Stigler, 1961, p. 69). In “A Treatise on 
the Family”, Gary S. Becker (1991) concluded that 
collecting information about potential partners 
stops when marginal costs equal marginal reve-
nue (Becker, 1991, p. 325).
Simon, Stigler and Becker’s research showed that 
theorists of rational choices had reviewed diff er-
ent spheres of social life on which they focused 
their attention, on the assumption of limited 
resources (Šveri, 1997, p. 43). In order to better 
understand the limitation factors, we can rely 
on Williamson’s interpretation of rationality. Wil-
liamson distinguishes three levels of rationality 
(Williamson, 2006, p. 40):
o In the narrow sense, rationality is defi ned as a 
purposeful activity of the subject focused on 
the realization of goals that are consistent with 
its internal hierarchy of preferences. Such goal 
realization ensures the stakeholders’ maxi-
mum benefi t level. Therefore, in the narrow 
sense, rationality is also referred to in literature 
as the principle of maximization. The most im-

























neoclassicists and supporters of the Chicago 
School.
o Rationality can also be formulated in a less 
strict form. The most consistent advocate of 
this form of rationality is Simon (Williamson, 
2006, p. 41). He notes that we do not have a 
lifetime to spend on decision-making, so peo-
ple generally do not maximize, but determine 
the level of personal satisfaction.
o Rationality can be observed in an organic form. 
We can consider the example of the conception 
of “an invisible hand”. After Adam Smith, the or-
ganic schools and diff erent evolutionary direc-
tions actively represented the organic form of 
this rationality. From the perspective of organic 
rationality, the maximization of individual and 
collective satisfaction is realized by trial and error 
(Williamson, 2006, p. 42). Such a view is based on 
the belief that personal and social rationality can 
be improved by developing a culture of individ-
ualism and market behavior of all members of 
social classes (Josifi dis & Lošonc, 2012).
The fi rst and the third principle of rationality are 
very similar, and a famous French proverb aptly ap-
plies to them – “extremes touch each other” (“les 
extremes se touchent”). In contemporary literature 
devoted to rational choice, organic and strict forms 
of rationality always coexist side by side.
3.  THEORY OF RATIONAL 
ADDICTION
Most of us think of addictive behavior as un-
wise, excessive, overindulgent, compulsive, de-
structive, and, of course, irrational. In examining 
addiction behavior, crucial unnecessary desires 
have a crucial (decisive) role (Ruden, 1997, p. 
105). In the throes of unnecessary desires, peo-
ple are not able to consider information, consult 
their preferences, and make decisions that are in 
their best interests. These people can be rational 
when excessive desires are not present.
Daniel Kahneman’s work has taken into account 
the following reasons for addiction behavior. The 
fi rst is the loss of aversion, when losses loom larg-
er than corresponding gains (Kahneman, 1994, p. 
22). The second involves framing eff ects, which 
show that equivalent lotteries presented in dif-
ferent ways are valued diff erently (Kahneman, 
1994, p. 22). Kahneman also fi nds evidence that 
addicts have 1) an inability to accurately pre-
dict their future utility from using goods, 2) an 
inability to predict changes in their tastes, and 
3) an inability to accurately evaluate how much 
utility they have gained from one experience 
(Kahneman, 1994, pp. 22-32). In addition, it is be-
lieved that there would be greater ineffi  ciency in 
the consumption of addictive goods than in the 
consumption of food supplies.
The broader message of previous analysis of ratio-
nal addiction suggests that addicts are something 
more than the standard rational economic man. 
In order to better understand what addiction is to 
people, it is necessary to have a broader and quite 
diff erent approach to economic behavior.
4. SOCIOECONOMIC 
MODEL OF ADDICTION 
BEHAVIOR
Noting the important appearances and discard-
ing less important features in a given context, 
the model demonstrates the importance of dif-
ferent types of capital (personal, social and con-
sumer) to make and implement decisions about 
the consumption of addictive goods.
4.1. Personal capital
The core of the socio-economic model of addic-
tive behavior is the idea that addiction is charac-
terized by a signifi cant internal imbalance that will 
aff ect one’s ability to perfect oneself and the envi-
ronment. When the degree of internal imbalance 
exceeds a certain limit, and the individual fi nds an 
addictive good to which a person is bound in or-

































likely that their personality will change under the 
infl uence of the consumption of psychoactive 
substances. In the fi fties, the professional journals 
of Western Europe and North America began to 
publish the results of case-control studies, which 
indicated a higher level of distress in the academ-
ic population. A high level of psychoactive sub-
stance abuse was later identifi ed in these young 
subjects. This can explain why the young exper-
iment with substances that can cause addiction 
in the long term, without thinking about the dan-
gerous possibility of becoming addicts.
According to Daniel J. Goleman, diff erent patterns 
of addictive behavior lead to the consumption of 
various substances (Goleman, 1994, pp. 254-255). 
There are two types of alcoholics. Chronically high 
levels of anxiety were observed in the fi rst type. 
The other involved a high level of agitation, impul-
siveness and apathy. People with this pattern of 
behavior turn to alcohol to escape their fears and 
slight agitation. Such emotional and spiritual im-
balances and other types of internal imbalances 
can cause addiction. These include: lack of proper 
nutrition, excessive levels of histamine etc.
4.2. Social capital
Social capital, in the form of a tangle of social 
connections and relationships, is not something 
that is given and which exists independently of 
our will, but it is rather a product of conscious 
human behavior (individual or collective), that 
is directed towards establishing or reproducing 
social relationships that individuals and groups 
can use in order to achieve goals (Bourdieu, 2012, 
p. 251). A special dimension of interpersonal re-
lationships is made of instrumental and social 
choices. Instrumental choices are characterized 
by respect for people and their abilities. Social 
choices are motivated by one’s desire to help 
people in need (Sokolovska, 2011, p. 226).
In their theoretical and empirical studies of nicotine 
dependence, Sandra Japuntich, Adam M. Leven-
thal, Megan E. Piper, Daniel M. Bolt, Linda J. Rob-
erts, Michael C. Fiore, and Timothy B. Baker (2011) 
dealt extensively with the impact of social capital 
in social networks (or groups) on smoking ces-
sation. They discovered that it was less likely for 
those participants who had a higher proportion of 
smokers in their social network to abstain during a 
six-month follow-up period. Moreover, there was a 
higher lapse risk (Japuntich et al., 2011, p. 290).
4.3. Consumer capital
George J. Stigler and Gary S. Becker (1977) pro-
posed the theory of rational addiction, which 
was improved by Gary S. Becker and Kevin M. 
Murphy (1988). In this theory, “a person is poten-
tially addicted to [some good] c if an increase in 
his current consumption of c increases his future 
consumption of c” (Green, 2002, p. 28). The key 
feature of these models is that the utility of the 
consumer at any given time depends not only 
on consumption in the period but also on “con-
sumption capital”. Consumer capital is, basically, 
the consumer’s ability to enjoy a certain good, 
which crucially depends on previous consump-
tion, and perhaps some other factors.
If previous consumption increases the ongoing 
ability to enjoy, the addiction is benefi cial. For ex-
ample, this may be the case with listening to clas-
sical music. Scientifi c research shows that listening 
to classical music has a positive eff ect on the ability 
to enjoy it (Green, 2002, p. 29). If previous consump-
tion reduces the ongoing ability to enjoy, then the 
addiction is harmful. This is the case with substanc-
es like heroin and other substances that are usually 
thought to be addictive. If the consumption of her-
oin is higher in the present, the enjoyment of any 
quantity of the substance will be less in the future.
5. STUDY OF NICOTINE 
ADDICTION
The aim of this research is to fi nd, on the basis 

























graphic and contextual variables can infl uence 
smoking cessation. By using a mathematical 
model, we had the special intention to deter-
mine whether current smokers are more rational 
than ex-smokers.
The model of rational choice assumes that, 
when deciding whether to smoke cigarettes 
or not, people use analysis in order to estimate 
the indicator values of individual preferences. 
From that perspective, there are risk and time 
preferences. The former shows aversion to a risk 
and is expressed through the coeffi  cient of risk 
aversion (indicator of risk preferences). For the 
higher coeffi  cient of risk aversion, risk aversion 
is greater. The latter measures the degree of 
preference for present satisfaction in relation to 
the same satisfaction in the future (Stojanović, 
2010, p. 68). The degree of preference for pres-
ent satisfaction regarding the same satisfaction 
in the future is expressed as the rate of time 
preference.
In order to determine the risk aversion coeffi  cient 
and the time preference rate of the respondents, 
we used Ida and Goto’s list of alternatives for the 
measurement of risk and time preferences (Ida, 
Goto, Takahashi & Nishimura, 2008, p. 6):
Alternative 1: Reward: 100,000 Winning probabil-
ity: 100%, Time delay: Now
Alternative 2: Reward: 150,000 Winning probabil-
ity: 90%, Time delay: One month
Alternative 3: Reward: 200,000 Winning probabil-
ity: 80%, Time delay: Six months
Alternative 4: Reward: 250,000 Winning probabil-
ity: 60%, Time delay: One year
Alternative 5: Reward: 300,000 Winning probabil-
ity: 40%, Time delay: Five years
The risk aversion coeffi  cient equals winning 
probability. Тhe time delay is used to deter-
mine the time preference rate. If the 100,000 re-
ward that the individual gets for a year is worth 
250,000 (Alternative 4), the time preference rate 
will be 150% in this case (Miki, Yokoyama, Sum-
itani, Kusaka, Warita, Matsumoto, Wang, Wilce, 
Bedi, Itoh, & Takeuchi, 2008).
Besides the list of alternatives for the measure-
ment of risk and time preferences, Ida and Goto’s 
work emphasized the connection between the 
risk aversion coeffi  cient and the time preference 
rate on the one hand, and successful cessation 
at the initial and fi nal phases of the study on the 
other (Ida et al., 2008, p. 4). In both phases, smok-
ers used the same technique to quit smoking and 
fi lled in a questionnaire that, among other things, 
contained a conjoint analysis to measure the risk 
aversion coeffi  cient and the time preference rate. 
Results showed that there are two groups of re-
spondents (smokers): 1) respondents with a high 
risk coeffi  cient and a low time preference rate and 
2) respondents with a low risk aversion coeffi  cient 
and a high time preference rate. In the initial phase 
of the study, persons successful in quitting had a 
greater risk aversion (higher risk aversion coeffi  -
cient). In the fi nal phase, the same persons were 
more patient (lower time preference rate) and had 
a higher aversion to risk than persons who failed 
to quit. Therefore, the results of Ida and Goto’s re-
search clearly indicated that we can predict a suc-
cessful cessation on the basis of the risk aversion 
coeffi  cient and the time preference rate (Ida et 
al., 2008, p. 4). Japanese scientists also discovered 
that people successful in quitting became more 
patient between the initial and fi nal phases of the 
study and that people who failed to quit became 
more impatient. We can expect that smokers who 
have achieved a low time preference rate and a 
high level of the risk aversion coeffi  cient will be 
successful in cessation. All this suggests that these 
parameters are not only important predictors for 
successful cessation, but also factors of individual 
rationality.
Taking into account these fi ndings, the rational 
choice model assumes that people will use the 
risk aversion coeffi  cient and the time preference 
rate to calculate the utility of alternatives. Let the 
utility of alternative i be Vi. In the rational choice 
model, the utility of the alternative is calculated 
on the basis of the equation of discounted and 






























































).   (3) 
At this point, we simply specify the functional 
form of utility as the RISK-th power of reward. 
Such a utility function is called the constant rel-
atively risk-averse form, where the coeffi  cient of 
the relative risk aversion is denoted by 1-RISK. By 
















Formula (4) was used in the survey to measure 
the net utility or rationality of current and former 
smokers.
Although the mathematical rational choice mod-
el is principally distinguished by its greater clarity 
and consistency than other techniques in social 
sciences, the rational choice model is to a certain 
extent “defi cient” when it comes to conveying 
all of the complexity of reality. This model lacks 
analysis of the impact of nicotine dependence 
and demographic and contextual variables on 
smokers. Sandra Japuntich and her colleagues 
analyzed the eff ects of these factors on the be-
havior of smokers (Japuntich et al., 2011, p. 286).
Daily smoking data was collected with a smok-
ing calendar using timeline follow-back. The 
maximum amount of time for recall was six 
weeks. Seven-day point-prevalence abstinence 
was assessed during a six-month follow-up call, 
and biochemically confi rmed (Japuntich et al., 
2011, p. 287). The three milestone variables were 
computed using smoking calendar data: 1) the 
initial abstinence variable, 2) the lapse variable, 
and 3) the relapse variable. The initial abstinence 
variable indicated whether participants report-
ed smoking zero cigarettes on at least one day 
in the fi rst 14 days of the study. The lapse vari-
able, coded for those who achieved initial ab-
stinence, was the number of days between the 
fi rst day when participants smoked zero ciga-
rettes, and the fi rst day when they smoked any 
amount (Japuntich et al., 2011, p. 287). Finally, 
the relapse variable, computed for participants 
who lapsed, was smoking. If participants did 
not reach a milestone (e.g., lapse/relapse), their 
milestone variable indicated the number of 
days from their last milestone until the end of 
the follow-up (Japuntich et al., 2011, p. 289). If 
they withdrew from the study before reaching 
a milestone, their milestone variable indicated 
the number of days from their last milestone 
until their withdrawal date.
Besides nicotine addiction, the survey conduct-
ed by Sandra Japuntich et al. (2011) found that 
demographic and contextual variables were 
signifi cant predictors of short-term and initial 
abstinence, lapse and lapse-relapse transition. 
The results also showed that contextual and de-
mographic variables tend to reduce initial absti-
nence probability.
5.1. Research hypotheses
Following the theoretical framework, fi ve hy-
potheses were set, as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Persons successful in smoking 
cessation have a greater risk aversion coeffi  cient 
than persons unsuccessful in smoking cessation.
Hypothesis 2: Persons successful in smoking 
cessation have a lower time preference rate than 
persons unsuccessful in smoking cessation.
Hypothesis 3: Ex-smokers are more rational 
than current smokers.
Hypothesis 4: Middle-aged smokers have the 
highest daily consumption of cigarettes, and 
they will be the most motivated to quit smoking.
Hypothesis 5: Women stop smoking to the 

























For the purposes of this research, we selected: 
two economics variables, three demographic 
variables and one contextual variable (economic 
variables: time preference rate, risk aversion coeffi  -
cient; demographic variables: gender, education, 
age; contextual variable: daily smoking). The vari-
ables used in this research can be conditionally 
divided into independent and dependent ones.
Independent: smoking cessation with two cat-
egories (current smokers or persons who have 
not quit smoking and ex-smokers or persons 
successful in smoking cessation, or nonsmokers), 
age (the young, the middle-aged and the elder-
ly), sex (male and female).
Dependent: risk aversion coeffi  cient, time prefer-
ence rate, rationality (net utility), cigarettes per day.
5.2. Research instruments
For the analysis of the relationships between 
these variables and smoking cessation, we used 
the following instruments: questionnaire, Fage-
strom’s Test for Nicotine Dependence and the 
rational choice model.
The questionnaire has 23 questions. Most ques-
tions (14) are closed questions (multiple choice 
questions). Questions asked at the beginning of the 
questionnaire (the fi rst seven) concern the person-
al data of respondents. The following 16 are asked 
in order to discover: the smoking habits of the re-
spondents, their knowledge about tobacco and its 
harmful eff ects, and if they have direct experience 
with some of tobacco’s harmful eff ects.
In order to provide the information base for the 
questionnaire, we used the following research 
studies: 1) Japuntich et al. (2011), “Smoker Char-
acteristics and Smoking-Cessation Milestones”, 
2) Ida et al. (2008), “Can Economic-Psychological 
Parameters Predict Successful Smoking Cessa-
tion?” and 3) Marković-Denčić, Knežević, Radović, 
Kisin and Šeparović (2007), “Smoking Prevalence 
in the Institute of Public Health in Serbia”.
Parts of the research conducted by S. Japuntich 
et al. (2011) which we applied in our paper are: 
Smoking-Cessation Milestones, Risk Factors for 
Cessation Failure, and Predicted Relationships. We 
used the results of Ida and Goto’s research on the 
correlation between economic parameters and 
successful cessation to measure the utility or ra-
tionality of the participants. In preparing the ques-
tionnaire, we also used the paper written by Ljil-
jana Marković-Denčić et al., which examined the 
following characteristics of smokers: the period of 
smoking, passive smoking in the family and the 
workplace, and the desire to quit smoking. 
In order to check whether the questions in the 
questionnaire were clear, we conducted a pilot 
piece of research showing that respondents had 
understood the questions and responded in a 
proper way.
Fagerström’s Test of Nicotine Dependence mea-
sures the degree of nicotine dependence. It con-
sists of six questions. The maximum number of 
points is 10 (Table 1).
Table 1: Level of dependence on nicotine
Results on 
Fagerström’s Test of 
Nicotine Dependence
The level of 
dependence on 
nicotine





8-10 Very high 
dependence
The core of the rational choice model consists of 
the risk aversion coeffi  cient and the time prefer-
ence rate. The risk aversion coeffi  cient negatively 
depends on the time preference rate (Figure 1). If 
a respondent with a high risk aversion coeffi  cient 
chooses alternative 1 from the list of alternatives 
to measure risk and time preferences (the risk 
aversion coeffi  cient is 100%), they will be reward-


































Figure 1:  Inverse proportion between the risk 
aversion coeffi  cient and the time 
preference rate
Time preference rate
Risk aversion coeffi  cient
The results of Ida and Goto’s research clearly indi-
cated that individuals successful in smoking ces-
sation were more patient than those who failed to 
achieve smoking cessation (Ida et al., 2008, p. 11). 
This means that individuals successful in smoking 
cessation exhibit higher values of the risk aver-
sion coeffi  cient. Therefore, since the risk aversion 
coeffi  cient negatively depends on the time pref-
erence rate, it can be concluded that individuals 
successful in smoking cessation have a lower time 
preference rate. Thus, the time preference rate is 
an indicator of patience or impatience. The higher 
it is, the higher a smoker’s impatience is.
In order to obtain a more realistic picture of the 
weight of variables, we prepared databases and 
performed factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) in 
the SPSS (computer program used for statistical 
analysis).
5.3. Sample 
The sample consists of 487 respondents, who 
are citizens of the city of Niš, Republic of Serbia. 
We surveyed current smokers and non-smokers 
– former smokers. The research was carried out 
during the period from April to July 2013.
The key steps in the formation of a simple ran-
dom sample are:
o Defi ning the population (large set). The sub-
ject of this research is the smoking habits of 
the population of Brzi Brod (Medijana munic-
ipality, the city of Niš). We performed the re-
search on subjects or respondents who live 
in Brzi Brod. There are 4,462 of these respon-
dents, according to the Statistical Offi  ce of the 
Republic of Serbia – Department for Statistics 
in Niš (2,136 men and 2,162 women).
o Selecting or deciding on the sample frame. 
We used a telephone survey to fi nd out about 
the smoking habits of the residents, which 
enabled us to exclude from the database all 
those who did not meet the selection criteria 
for the sample, specifi cally, all the residents of 
Brzi Brod who had never smoked. To defi ne 
the sample frame, we used: a list of the pop-
ulation of Brzi Brod (made by the local offi  ce 
of Brzi Brod) and the 2011 Census Book. The 
sample frame consists of all of those who de-
clared themselves (in the telephone survey) to 
be smokers or ex-smokers (a total of 3,231 or 
72.4% of the population of Brzi Brod).
o Selecting the simple size. Given the circum-
stances (time and costs), we elected 15% as 
the sample, giving a sample size of 487. Ac-
cordingly, the probability of being included in 
the sample or choice rate was 487/3,231.
The demographic and contextual characteristics 
of the respondents in the sample are shown in 
Table 2.
Table 2: Demographics and descriptive statistics
Measure Total Total              %
Gender
Female 44.8             218
Male 55.2             269
Education
<High school   3.0                15
High school 57.0              277
College 40.0             195
Marital status
Partner/widowed   3.5                17
Married/cohabiting 45.9             224
Divorced/separated   5.8                28
Never married 44.8             218
Age 39.5x (15.4)y
FTND    4.2x (2.7)y
Time preference rate 46.7x (60.6)y



























The results of the Fagerström Test for Nicotine 
Dependence show a low degree of dependence 
among the respondents. The average degree 
of nicotine dependence in the sample was 3.93. 
The same indicator was 3.7 for persons successful 
in smoking cessation and 4.2 for persons unsuc-
cessful in smoking cessation. People successful in 
smoking cessation (persons with a low degree of 
nicotine dependence) thought that they could 
quit smoking at any moment (Ida et al., 2008, p. 
6), and they were more patient than people with 
a higher level nicotine dependence (individuals 
who had not quit smoking). Their time prefer-
ence rate was 37%. On the other hand, the time 
preference rate for smokers with higher levels of 
nicotine dependence, who had obviously be-
come physical and mental addicts, was 57% (Ida 
et al., 2008, p. 6). To be precise, patience awards 
a higher risk aversion coeffi  cient to people with 
lower levels of nicotine dependence. The risk 
aversion coeffi  cient for people with low levels 
of nicotine dependence was 88%. The risk aver-
sion coeffi  cient for those with a high degree of 
nicotine dependence was 84%. The risk aversion 
coeffi  cient in the sample was 86%.
5.4. Analysis of results 
We employed the analysis of variance or ANO-
VA to study the eff ect of quitting (the number 
of days without cigarettes) on the risk aversion 
coeffi  cient and the time preference rate. Accord-
ing to the number of days without cigarettes, 
subjects were divided into fi ve groups (group 1: 
30 days; group 2: from 31 to 90 days, group 3: 91 
to 180 days; group 4: 180 days or more; group 5: 
no attempt to quit).
The hypothesis that persons successful in smok-
ing cessation are more risk-averse than persons 
unsuccessful in smoking cessation (Hypothesis 1) 
was confi rmed. In other words, a statistically sig-
nifi cant diff erence was identifi ed, at p <0.05 LOT 
results of group: F (4, 482) = 4.613, p = 0.013. Re-
sults of Tykey’s HSD test showed that the mean 
value of group 4 (M = 93, 0435, SD = 12.22322) 
was signifi cantly diff erent from the mean value 
of group 5 (M = 85.6098, SD = 18.33339).
The results of the analysis of variance also show 
that persons who had quit smoking exhibited 
greater patience than persons unsuccessful in 
smoking cessation (Hypothesis 2 was confi rmed). 
When considered more closely, the mean value 
of group 3 (M = 70 0000, SD = 4,472,136) is signifi -
cantly diff erent from the mean value of group 5 
(M = 59.7561, SD = 7,001,742)1. The other groups 
do not diff er signifi cantly from groups 3 or 5.
The hypothesis related to the middle-aged and 
smoking was confi rmed by the results of the 
research (Hypothesis 3 was confi rmed). The di-
agram of the mean values (the product of ANO-
VA in SPSS) shows that the group of 30-44 years 
olds exhibited the highest daily smoking (Figure 
2). On the other hand, it was middle-aged smok-
ers who had a greater milestone rate, or a larger 
number of attempts at smoking cessation.
Figure 2: Diagram of the mean values of the re-
sults obtained by the age group analysis
It was found that women stopped smoking to 
the same extent as men did. The results of this 
research showed that women make up 48.5% of 
the people who stopped smoking and 45.8% of 
the people who failed to quit. Similarly, Japuntich 
and associates’ research detected that women 
stopped smoking to the same extent as men did, 
but it was more likely that women, after initial ab-
stinence, would re-light a cigarette, and then in-
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The hypothesis that refers to the connection be-
tween the success in quitting and the rational 
behavior of participants (smokers and ex-smokers) 
was not confi rmed. Those who were either suc-
cessful or unsuccessful in quitting smoking were 
not signifi cantly diff erent in statistical terms when 
it came to rational behavior. Having considered the 
nicotine dependence and economic variables, it 
was found that, out of a total of 487 participants, 
364 (75% of current and former smokers) preferred 
safe profi t or the alternative of the losing probability 
(see the list of alternatives on page 12). The average 
value of the risk aversion coeffi  cient in the sample 
was 86%. All this suggests that rational behavior is 
not correlated with smoking behavior.
A broader analysis of the demographic charac-
teristics of smokers indicates that highly educat-
ed individuals were more likely to abstain during 
the six-month follow-up period, to achieve initial 
abstinence, and to have a lower risk of regression 
than those without a high level of education (Ja-
puntich et al., 2011, p. 289).
Confi rmation of this fi nding can be found in Har-
ris and Harris’s papers. As a higher level of edu-
cation provides higher income and generally in-
creases the effi  ciency consumption of all goods, 
Harris and Harris (1996) believe that an increase in 
wages (which can be understood as the result of 
a higher level of education) will provide a great-
er incentive to quit smoking in the future. The 
results of Harris and Harris’s research of the bad 
(smoking) habits of Maryland residents showed 
that highly educated smokers had a strong and 
reasonable need for smoking cessation, since 
they found motivation in the pursuit of profi t 
maximization, and the irrational spending of 
money on tobacco certainly was not the way to 
achieve that goal (Harris & Harris, 1996, p. 616).
Arthur M. Jones (1994) concluded that successful 
cessation is concentrated among members of 
high social classes who are highly educated. The 
fact that self-control assumptions for explaining 
smoking cessation are better than assumptions 
of rational behavior also emerges from Jones’s 
analysis (Jones, 1994, p. 101).
5.5. Limitations and future 
research
The discrepancy between some results of the 
research and reality can be explained by the re-
search methodology to a large extent.
o For the study, we used a sample that includes 
residents of only one district in Niš, and not all 
of them. Furthermore, it is recommended that 
research include a larger number of respon-
dents in order for the results to be more repre-
sentative (Ozretić Došen, Krupka & Škare, 2011, 
p. 183).
o The limitation of this research is that contex-
tual variables were measured via retrospective 
questionnaires. Therefore, in order to promote 
the appropriate scientifi c response to the chal-
lenges of the global epidemic of smoking, we 
may propose the application of methods for 
data collection in real time. Future research 
could use these methods to examine whether 
stronger relationships are found between ra-
tionality and milestones when economics and 
demographic variables are measured in real 
time.
o It is not possible to control the mixed (confus-
ing) eff ects of unknown variables. Examples 
of confusing variables which can potentially 
aff ect the results of the research are: the ex-
posure of the subject to other professional 
agents that increase the risk of smoking, the 
reduction in personal income due to reduced 
productivity and more frequent use of sick 
leave, as well as fi re or explosion caused by un-
quenched cigarettes (Krstev, 2007, p. 11).
o All research of economic rationality must nec-
essarily, in one way or another, face three fun-
damental and interdependent problems.
o What goals do the participants prefer? In oth-
er words, do the participants prefer the goals 
of pro-individual orientation or the goals of 
pro-social orientation?
o According to rational choice theory, the goals 
of pro-individual orientation build the instru-
mental rationality model, while the goals of 
pro-social orientation build the model of the 

























pants prefer the goals of pro-individual orien-
tation, then the instrumental rationality model 
better explains the behavior of the respon-
dents. Otherwise, the model of values or ex-
pressive rationality more satisfyingly expresses 
market participants’ behavior.
o Is there a connection between the goals and 
what is the nature of these relationships?
o Which scale do we use? In other words, should 
the goals of pro-individual and pro-social ori-
entation be measured with the interval and 
relational scale that enables the application of 
all the statistical methods of analysis, or should 
the analyzed characteristics of the subject be 
measured with the nominal and ordinal scale 
that enables the application of certain statisti-
cal techniques in a more effi  cient manner?
o In the explanation of the factors that infl uence 
smoking, the time dimension is excluded (ob-
served in the physical, Newtonian sense), and 
the fact that all activities take place in time is 
ignored. In this way it is implicitly assumed 
that all the actions of market participants take 
place at once.
In order to get a better insight into the role that 
time has in the decision-making process, it is 
necessary to analyze the behavior of smokers 
in the initial and fi nal phases of the research.
o The rational choice model excludes the in-
tuition and irrational thinking that economic 
agents have when trying to design the future 
from analysis. Although the application of the 
rational choice model provides a clearer and 
more complex understanding of reality, the 
eff ectiveness of the presentation content ele-
ments still require a minimum of mathemati-
cal methods.
In applied contexts, mathematics is not a goal 
per se. It is only a means to effi  cient processing 
of relevant data.
6. CONCLUSION
Few concepts have caused such interest in eco-
nomic science in recent years as that of rational 
behavior. For a relatively long time, the scope 
of the economic approach was limited to the 
market and the analysis of rationality, which was 
understood as utility maximization, and was fo-
cused on production factors and their allocation. 
Preferences, technology and resources were tak-
en as they are, and the impact of these external 
factors was the subject of research by other sci-
entifi c disciplines. This pattern changed radically 
in the 20th century, when more space may have 
been created for the analysis of the impact of so-
cio-cultural factors on economic behavior.
Contemporary economic science tries to incor-
porate non-economic phenomena in the analy-
sis of rational choice, which creates conditions for 
the analysts to see economic phenomena and 
their consequences in the right way. Presenting 
diff erent academic disciplines, Kahneman, Beck-
er, Murphy, and others (analysts) discovered lots 
of factors that infl uence human behavior. By 
including new methods in the analysis of ratio-
nal behavior, these authors have enriched the 
analytical instrumentation of economic science. 
Their work laid the foundation principle of the 
new reciprocity model between the represen-
tatives of various scientifi c disciplines and rein-
forced mutual connections between empirical 
and theoretical research. It is this interdisciplinary 
collaboration and continuous creative contact 
between researchers who determine experi-
mental facts, and scientists who propose the-
oretical explanations, that will almost certainly 
become the driving mechanism of the progress 
of economic science in the 21st century.
On the basis of the previously mentioned con-
cepts of rational choice, many studies followed, 
including very interesting analysis of addiction 
behavior. In this paper, we considered the exam-
ple of addiction behavior as related to smoking. 
The aim of our study was to determine whether 
economic, demographic and contextual vari-
ables can infl uence smoking cessation. The use 
of the mathematical model had a special pur-
pose to determine whether smokers are more 
rational than non-smokers (ex-smokers). The 
analysis of the impact of nicotine dependence 

































smokers emphasized four statistically signifi cant 
diff erences. Individuals successful in smoking 
cessation were more risk averse than individu-
als who had failed to achieve smoking cessation 
(Hypothesis 1 was confi rmed). Individuals suc-
cessful in smoking cessation were more patient 
than individuals who failed to achieve smoking 
cessation (Hypothesis 2 was confi rmed). Mid-
dle-aged smokers exhibited the largest daily 
consumption of cigarettes, and they would be 
the most motivated to quit smoking (Hypothe-
sis 4 was confi rmed). Women stopped smoking 
to the same extent as men did (Hypothesis 5 
was confi rmed). The hypothesis that success in 
quitting and rational behavior of participants 
(smokers and ex-smokers) were connected was 
confi rmed (Hypothesis 3 was not confi rmed).
In a sense, the present analysis of the dependent 
behavior of rational choice theory represents an 
affi  rmation of the microeconomic approach to 
appearances. It actually extends a valuable and 
fruitful tradition in economics, and the models 
and methods developed in the science are used 
to study phenomena beyond economics. In ad-
dition, this paper shows, in a very concrete way, 
how economic models allow us to improve the 
level of understanding not only of the economy 
but also of the world in which we live.
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APPENDIX: RATIONAL CHOICE MODEL
Choose one of the alternatives
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 Alternative 4 Alternative 5
Reward 100 000 150 000 200 000 250 000 300 000
Time delay immediately
in a month’s 
time
In six months’ 
time
In a year’s time




100% 90% 80% 60% 40%
Choose one
Endnotes
1 The quotient of the variance between groups and variance within groups: F(4, 482)=4.613, p=0.013
            
